On October 25, 1968, Ed Broadbent rose in the House of Commons to table his first bill as a Member of Parliament. At first glance Bill C-3, Modernization of Law of Picketing, sounded fairly modest in ambition. Its purpose was to amend a subsection of Canada’s Criminal Code so that striking workers would be free to promote their cause and try to persuade others to support it without being charged under existing provisions related to “watching or besetting.”
In effect, however, its purpose was to advance a radically democratic idea of free speech — something Broadbent understood to be a collective value in addition to an individual one. Among other things, his speech about the bill thus recognized the importance of collective moral persuasion to great mass movements throughout history.
From the 1960s until his passing, the guiding ideal of Ed Broadbent’s public life was that liberal rights like freedom of speech and freedom of expression are necessary but insufficient guarantors of democratic equality. In this spirit, his first bill as Member of Parliament proposed a modest change to the language of Canada’s Criminal Code that was incredibly profound in its implications.
— Luke Savage
Mr. Speaker, this bill is proposed as an amendment to subsection (2) of section 366 of the Criminal Code of Canada. The purpose of the bill is to permit the peaceful picketing by any number of people for the purpose not only of communicating information but also of persuading other employees and people having business dealings with a struck company to support the cause of pick-eters, particularly in the case of a lawful strike.
At present section 366 of the Criminal Code prohibits intimidation by means of violence, threats, disorderly conduct and by watching or besetting.
Subsection (2) of section 366 provides an exception in applying the concepts of watching or besetting. It asserts that a person does not watch or beset within the meaning of section 366 if he “attends at or near or approaches a dwelling house or place, for the purpose only of obtaining or communicating information.”
As the law now reads there are two major flaws in it. The first is that a judge may reasonably decide that in the case of an otherwise legally conducted strike any number of pickets exceeding one is a form of intimidation. This is so because subsection (2) begins with the words “A person who attends at or near”. My proposed amendment would remove the possibility of such a decision. By replacing the singular “person” with the plural “persons” no ambiguity on the question of numbers permitted in a strike is possible.
The second flaw in subsection (2) as it now reads is that it asserts that one does not watch or beset if one’s purpose is only to obtain or communicate information. The legal force of this reading is that if men on strike, in addition to imparting information, seek actively to persuade others to follow their example, they can be charged with watching or besetting.
My proposed revision of subsection (2) would make it a legitimate purpose of picketing to persuade or to attempt to persuade, without violence or attempts at violence, others to do or not to do something.
I would like to speak briefly on the justification for the proposed changes. In suggesting that the law make clear the right of any number of men to join a picket line, I do so primarily because a number of people acting jointly for a common cause do affect the thinking of others. To see one man demonstrating may arouse little interest and even less concern. But to see 50, 100, 1,000 or several thousand will, in the thinking of most men, provoke a much more serious response. When confronted with a large gathering, all but the most hardened are moved to ask themselves: Why do these men assemble? What is their purpose? Is their cause a just one? Shall I support them? Should I join them?
You will note, Mr. Speaker, that my point here is not that numbers alone provide a reason for concluding that the purpose of any particular assembly of men or any specific picket line is a just one, but rather that such gatherings do suggest that many men think they are acting for a good and just purpose and that others, especially those directly affected, are much more likely to give serious thought to the question at issue.
A free society, therefore, must make it a legal right for workers as well as others to persuade as many as they can that their cause merits support. To deny this right to these workers is to deny them a fundamental freedom.
Peaceful demonstrators in the past and at present, both in liberal and non-liberal societies, have always recognized this truth. The early Christian martyrs, seventeenth century reformers, nineteenth century democrats and twentieth century workers-each of these groups sought to evoke a positive moral response among others by peacefully gathering in large numbers and thus provoking consciousness of a serious problem, a just cause, or a way of life. I submit that the law of Canada should recognize this important human fact and clearly establish its legal propriety.
The second major effect of my proposed amendment can be defended even more briefly than the first. By giving to strikers the right to persuade others to act in a legal manner, we will simply be doing what ought to have been done long ago. One of the defining characteristics of a free society is the right to influence others’ actions by means of reasonable arguments. Those who seek to persuade men of the rightness of their cause should not be restricted to the right to communicate information; they should also have the right to argue for its moral propriety. Facts alone are insufficient grounds for moral choice. Facts must be linked by supporting reasons. A free society, therefore, must make it a legal right for workers as well as others to persuade as many as they can that their cause merits support. To deny this right to these workers is to deny them a fundamental freedom.
For these reasons, Mr. Speaker, I urge support of my bill.